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OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
well's likely production. This measure of damages would appear to be readily
applicable to a case with the facts of Burger v. Wood."
Conclusion
It is very likely that the decision in Burger v. Wood is the result of a
misunderstanding, or at least a misapplication, of the doctrine of obstruc-
tion. The facts of the case do not include the essential ingredient of the
lessor's interference with the lessee's operations. Without this factor, the case
lacks any theoretical support.
While the lessee's predicament was a lamentable one, a better course of
action would have been to institute suit against the surface owner. If the
court had affirmed the trial court's decision, but explained this alternative in
its opinion, the plaintiff would have had enough time to bring suit against
the proper party before the statute of limitations expired?8 In this way, the
court would have assisted the lessee with his problem and, at the same time,
would have avoided the dangerous precedent of segregating a doctrine from
its underlying philosophy and applying it at will to reach a desired, though
unjustifiable, result.
Cindy Keely
Oil and Gas: "Preferred. Use" of Natural Gas for
Agricultural Purposest
The Oklahoma legislature has undertaken efforts to insure that there is a
dependable source of energy for use in the operation of irrigation pumps.
This has been done through preferred use legislation requiring the sale of
natural gas by the owner or operator of a natural gas well or pipeline com-
pany to the agricultural occupant for use in irrigation operations. There are
numerous constitutional objections to the preferred use doctrine, but such
legislation is justified by the state's interest in the health and welfare of the
citizens of Oklahoma.
Oklahomans can be justifiably proud of the progress that has been
made since the "dust bowl" days, but steps must be taken to protect against
recurrence. The climate of Oklahoma is considered to be "continental',' in
type, as is true of all the central Great Plains. Summers are long and hot,
and the state has at times been subjected to droughts of varying intensity and
575 F.2d 977 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
7' The landowner's interference occurred Nov. 18-20, 1976, while the court of appeals
reached its decision on Jan. 24, 1978. This is well within the two-year statute of limitations for
torts.
"This paper is one of two papers awarded the Eugene 0. Kuntz Scholarship for 1981,
presented by H.B. Watson, Jr., Partner, Watson, McKenzie & Moricoli, Oklahoma City.-Ed.
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duration. The average annual precipitation ranges from 56 inches in the
southeastern quadrant of the state to approximately only 15 inches in the
westernmost section of the panhandle.'
Because of the often inadequate supply of rainfall and accompanying
droughts there exists a great need in the state for adequate supplies of energy
for the operation of irrigation pumps. The use of pumps for irrigation pur-
poses is prevalent because of the availability of ample supplies of water in
groundwater reservoirs.' These groundwater reserves supply approximately
80 percent of the water used for irrigation. 3 As of 1978, there were 645,091
acres of land under irrigation in the state, with the majority in the western
portion of Oklahoma.4 Coincidentally, this is also the same geographic area
of major production of natural gas within the state.5
The agricultural and the oil and gas industries are among the largest in-
dustries in the state.6 The agricultural industry, however, is dependent on an
adequate and reliable source of energy" for irrigation operations in order to
maintain its status in the state's economy. Agriculture is basic to the state's
economy, and the low levels of precipitation require that irrigation opera-
tions be undertaken both to preserve the economy of the state and to prevent
another "dust bowl" from occurring. Natural gas is not only readily
available but is also one of the most efficient energy sources available for the
operation of irrigation pumps. 8
The Oklahoma legislature has determined that the extent of the public
interest in ensuring an adequate and dependable energy source for the opera-
tion of irrigation pumps justifies requiring the natural gas industry to sell gas
for such purposes above all other uses that could be made of such gas.' This
has been done by exercising the police power of the state to regulate the use
of natural resources and to prevent waste. Despite judicial setbacks, this
legislative determination remains in effect in the state of Oklahoma. The pur-
l Phase 1, Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan, Resources, at 1 (1975).
2 Oklahoma Geological Survey, Educational Publication 1, at 8 (updated 1979).
3Id.
I Oklahoma Water Resources Board, Reported Water Use in Oklahoma 1978, Pub.
102, at 78 (1980). Approximately 1,905,667 acre-feet of water is used annually in Oklahoma for
irrigation.
I Oklahoma Geological Survey, Educational Publication 1, at 7 (updated 1979).
6 In January of 1978 cumulative production of natural gas within the state was 40.6
billion cubic feet and had a total value of more than $36 billion. Oklahoma Geological Survey,
Educational Publication 1, at 7 (updated 1979).
7 Statistics showing estimated proved natural gas reserves in Oklahoma indicate ade-
quate reserves for many years. American Gas Assoc., Annual Report, at 170 (1979).
1 Buster v. Phillips Pet. Co., 133 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. Okla. 1955), in which evidence
was introduced showing irrigation farming would not be profitable if natural gas could not be
used for operation of the pumps. Testimony showed that the cost of gasoline would be "enor-
mous"; butane would cost more than ten times as much as natural gas; and electric facilities
were not available. Note that this case did not involve statutory construction but was based on
promissory estoppel in a private contract dispute.
9 52 OKLA. STAT. § 248-56 (1971) [declared unconstitutional in Phillips Pet. Co. v. Cor-
poration Comm'n, 312 P.2d 916 (Okla. 1956)]; and 52 OKLA. STAT. § 524-28 (Supp. 1977).
19811
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pose of this note is to identify constitutional objections to the preferred use
legislation and to determine whether these defects have been remedied by
subsequent legislation.
Constitutional Objections to 52 Oklahoma Statutes § 248-56
In 1955 the Oklahoma legislature enacted a statute'0 with the basic ob-
jective of requiring an owner or operator of a natural gas well to sell a por-
tion of the natural gas produced from the well to the lessor for the operation
of irrigation water wells. The legislature expressly recognized the need for
irrigation to preserve the agricultural industry because irrigation increases
production and because the industry is of great importance to the state's
economy." The areas most in need of irrigation operations are often the
same areas from under which large volumes of natural gas are produced.
This readily available natural gas could supply an adequate and reliable
source of power for the irrigation pumps.'2 Thus the statute provides that
"the use of natural gas on the premises from which it is produced to pump to
the surface water to be used for irrigation on such premises is a preferred
use, prior in order to all other uses [to] which such gas may be devoted. '"'3
The statute further provided:
[Elvery person owning or operating any well from which natural gas is
produced... shall make available from the production of such well, to
the person or persons engaged in agricultural activities upon such
premises, if requested to do so, sufficient gas for the operation of
pumps necessary for the pumping of such amount of water, produced
from wells on such premises, as may be necessary and proper for the ir-
rigation of such portion of said premises as may be devoted to the
growth of agricultural products or to pasture or orchard uses 4 ....
[S]uch gas shall be made available for such use in preference to any
other use.
5
The statute required the price to be "reasonable" but not less than the price
of the gas sold at the wellhead, with terms and conditions to protect the
operator of the well.'
6
The parties were to determine the prices, terms, and conditions of their
agreement by negotiations. If the negotiations fail, however, an application
,0 52 OKL4. STAT. §§ 248-56 (1971).
Id. § 2,18.
22 Note that the use of gas for irrigation purposes does not fall within the common pro-
visions of the "free gas" clause in the oil and gas lease. There is a growing practice, therefore, in
those areas of the country where gas is produced and irrigation is required for agriculture, to
negotiate for some provision in the lease whereby the lessee is required to sell natural gas to the
lessor for use in operating irrigation pumps. 4 E. KUNTZ, OIL AND GAS § 53.7 (1972).
" 52 OKLA. STAT. § 248 (1971).
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to the Corporation Commission could be made requesting the Commission to
fix the terms of the natural gas purchase contract. The Corporation Commis-
sion must consider all factors relevant to the purpose of the 1955 act and
render justice to all concerned, but it must specifically consider the "necessity
of the applicant for the gas . . . " the "efficient operation of the wells . .. "
and the "obligations assumed by the producer in the sale or other disposition
of such gas."'
7
The 1955 statute specifically provided that no obligation was to be
imposed on the well operator to furnish gas for use off the premises or to
assume the duties of a public utility to the public at large. 8 Penalties were
provided for failure to make the gas available, including "all damages suf-
fered as a result"' 9 of the inability to irrigate because of the "failure to per-
form such duty.""0
The constitutionality of the statute was quickly challenged. In the 1955
federal district court case, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jones,' Phillips sought
injunctive relief against enforcement of the statute on several grounds.
Phillips alleged it would suffer immediate and irreparable harm if the statute
were enforced, that the statute constituted a taking of private property
without due process of law, and that its enforcement would result in impair-
ment of private contractual obligations by placing an undue burden on com-
merce.
22
The basic issue of the case was whether federal jurisdiction ought to be
exercised. The court responded by stating that federal jurisdiction should not
be exercised to strike down a state statute unless that statute were clearly
unconstitutional.22 This statute was determined not to be unconstitutional on
its face as it was susceptible of a construction protecting the well owner's
interests. The purpose of a statute is determined by its effect and as the
Oklahoma court had not yet construed the act, the federal court deferred
until such time as the state court addressed the issues.
24
The basic objective of the statute (the use of natural gas for the opera-
tion of irrigation wells) was recognized as one lying within the local police
power authority. There is a universally recognized right of the state to con-
serve and protect valuable natural resources and individual rights may be cur-
tailed or even denied in the furtherance of such objectives.25 Turning to the
impairment of contracts issue, the federal district court determined that if the
statute were construed as an unconditional obligation to furnish the gas
", Id. § 251.
" Id. § 254.
" Id. § 256.
' Id.
21 147 F. Supp. 122 (D. OkIa. 1955).
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without regard to prior contracts it would be unconstitutional.2 6 There is
however, no presumption that the Oklahoma legislature intended to impair
basic constitutional rights.27 In making this determination the federal court
considered the fact that the Corporation Commission was required to con-
sider relevant factors and that the language of the 1955 statute is susceptible
of a construction that would permit the Corporation Commission to deny the
gas if the circumstances were appropriate. 2
Although the federal court had recognized that the Oklahoma legis-
lature's attempt to use one subterranean resource to assist in the capture of
another critically needed subsurface mineral to benefit the state's economy
was within the police power of the state, 29 Phillips again challenged the
statute, this time in state court. In the case of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cor-
poration Commission," Phillips again sought to prohibit the Corporation
Commission from proceeding under the statute on the grounds that the act
was an unconstitutional taking of private property without due process of
law.
Phillips argued that the act violated both the state and federal constitu-
tions in that it attempted to convert Phillips into a public utility, although it
was recognized by the agricultural occupants that Phillips was not a public
utility and had not dedicated its service to the supplying of natural gas for
irrigation.3 ' The Corporation Commission contended that the statute con-
stituted a valid exercise of the police power and did not deprive Phillips of
property without due process. Further, it contended that the statute is not a
"taking" of gas but a regulation under the police power of the use that may
be made of a small portion of the gas. 32 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held
that it was immaterial that the service was limited to a small area and a few
people, stating, "If the producer of gas can be required to serve a small area
and a few people, we see no reason why he could not be required to serve a
larger area and more people." 33 The issue, as seen by the court, was not
whether gas produced from the wells may be taken by eminent domain to
pump for irrigation, but whether a producer of gas may be required to make
26 Id. at 125. Notwithstanding the constitutional prohibition against impairment of the
obligations of contract, all contracts are subject to the police power of the state and where the
subject matter of the contract is one which affects the safety and welfare of the public it is within
the supervising power and control of the legislature. 16A AM. JUR. 2d, Constitutional Law § 396
(1979).
27 Phillips Pet. Co. v. Jones, 147 F. Supp. 122, 125 (D. Okla. 1955).
25 Id. at 126.
29 Id.
30 312 P.2d 916 (Okla. 1956).
32 Id. at 918. Compelling a public utility to service a market it has not professed to
undertake has been held to be an appropriation of private property without just compensation.
Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 88 Okla. 51, 211 P. 401 (1922).
32 Phillips Pet. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 312 P.2d 916, 918 (Okla. 1956).
" Id. at 919.
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a portion available for these purposes upon prices, terms, and conditions to
be imposed by the Commission as a regulation under the police power.3'
The court found no cases authorizing a taking of private property from
a business or industry under the police power, for use in another business or
industry clothed with a public purpose. There are cases where a taking was
authorized under the police power but the taking was accomplished by con-
demnation under the power of eminent domain." Thus, the court held that
the statute was not a regulation under the police power but would, if
enforced, constitute a taking of private property without due process of law
and was therefore unconstitutional.
36
Although the act under consideration purported to make the use of
natural gas for irrigation purposes a preferred use, the court made no
reference to the preferred use doctrine.3 A noted scholar in the areas of con-
stitutional law and oil and gas has referred to the decision in the Phillips case
as a "judicial setback" for the doctrine of preferred use." This doctrine falls
under the general subject of the power of the state to regulate the use of
natural resources in the interest of the public welfare.
"Preferred Use" Legislation: History and Development
It is generally accepted that the states, under the police power, may
allocate and conserve the scarce natural resources found upon and beneath
their lands. The regulation of various phases of oil and gas operations in
order to prevent waste of the oil and gas and to protect correlative rights of
the landowners has been held constitutional.3 9 The theory under which these
various regulations have been constitutionally sustained is that such regula-
tions are a valid exercise of the police power to prevent waste and protect
correlative rights.40 Individual contract and property rights must yield to a
proper exercise of the police power.
Whether specific legislation is a proper exercise of the police power
depends upon whether it can withstand the constitutional test required for
such action. The Oklahoma court has set out this test in a recent case in
which it stated, "The police power is a necessary and inherent attribute of
sovereignty and where legislation based thereon bears a real, substantial and
legitimate relation to the general welfare of the public it is valid." 4 '
34 Id.
11 Id. An extensive discussion was given by the court on the distinctions between eminent
domain and the police power. Eminent domain "takes" property because it is useful to the
public, while the police power regulates the use of property or impairs rights in property because
the free exercise of these rights is detrimental to the public interest.
36 Id. at 922.
, Kuntz, Discussion Note, 7 O.G.&.R. 1040 (1956).
' M. MERRILL, THE PUBLIC'S CONCERN WITH FUEL MINERALS 97 (1960).
" 5 E. KuNTz, OIL AND GAS § 70.2 (1978).
40 Id. See also Note, Oil and Gas: State Regulation of Natural Gas to Prevent Waste and
Protect Correlative Rights- What Power Remains Today?, 25 OKLA. L. R v. 427 (1972).




The doctrine establishing preferred use developed from the concept of
the prevention of waste of natural resources., 2 The law of waste is based on
public policy regarding resource use, that is, conserving the resource and pro-
moting efficient production.4 3 The basic argument in favor of the prevention
of waste of oil and gas is that such waste would deprive the nation of much
needed and valuable resources.4" A need for an appreciation of the advan-
tages of conservation for its own sake has been recognized. Society has
become concerned about the preservation of valuable resources and has ex-
pressed a desire that resources be devoted to uses that will best promote the
public welfare."5
To carry out this desire, public control has been exerted over private
actions that might cause waste. The regulation of wasteful practices may be
in the form of direct regulations that prohibit certain practices or that pro-
hibit production so long as certain practices resulting in waste continue.46 No
matter how the control to prevent waste is exerted, it has been recognized
that no one has an inalienable right to waste his own gas and oil to the injury
of either his neighbor or the public.
47
The concept of waste of a natural resource has been expanded to
include a use that is less valuable and necessary than higher uses.48 This is
justified on the basis of prevention of waste caused by low or inferior use of
the resource. Early decisions have upheld statutes that prohibited the useless
waste of natural gas, water, and other valuable natural resources. 9 As early
as 1920, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Walls v. Midland
Carbon Co.,50 recognized the validity of a state regulation prohibiting an
inferior use of natural gas.
In the Walls case, a Wyoming statute prohibiting the burning of natural
gas for the manufacture of carbon black was challenged on the grounds that
the act transcended the police power of the state and violated the equal pro-
": M. MERRILL, THE PUBLIC'S CONCERN WITH FUEL MINERALS 96 (1960). Regulation for
the prevention of waste has been recognized as within the police power of the state. See Minshall
v. Corporation Comm'n, 485 P.2d 1058 (Okla. 1971) (statute governing regulation and inspec-
tion of all abandoned wells leaking salt water, oil, gas, or other deleterious substances not in
violation of constitution); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 51 F.2d 823, mod.
286 U.S. 210 (1932) (act authorizing Corporation Commission to make rules and regulations to
prevent waste held constitutional).
41 M. HARRIS, LEGAL-ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF WASTE LAW AS IT RLATES TO FARMING 96
(1974).
( Id. at 95.
' M. MERRILL, THE PUBLIC'S CONCERN WITH FUEL MINERALS 95 (1960).
41 5 E. KUNTz, OIL AND GAS § 75.1 (1978).
41 M. HARRIS, LEGAL-ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF WASTE LAW AS IT RELATES TO FARMING 97
(1974).
4' Id.
41 Merrill, Stabilization of the Oil Industry and Due Process of Law, 3 So. CAL. L. REv.
396 (1930). Cy. Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont. 372, 207 P. 993 (1922) (statute pro-
hibiting the use of natural gas for the manufacture of carbon black held unconstitutional).
50 254 U.S. 300 (1920).
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tection and due process provisions of the Constitution."' The question ad-
dressed by the Court was whether the legislation was a legal conservation of
the natural resources of the state, or an arbitrary interference with private
rights. The wisdom of the statute was not in issue; rather it was the power of
the state to make the regulation that was challenged.52 The Supreme Court
recognized that the decision regarding the relative values of carbon black and
raw gas was for the state legislature to determine.5
3
The state has the power to regulate property in which others may have
rights and in which the state has an interest. Because natural gas is one of the
resources of the state, the legislature has the power to prohibit any extrava-
gant, wasteful, or disproportionate use of the natural gas. A comparison of
the value of the industries and a judgment upon them as affecting the state
was for the state to make.
54
The Oklahoma court followed the Walls case in Quinton Relief Oil &
Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission. 5 An order by the Corporation Com-
mission prohibiting Quinton Relief Oil and Gas Company from selling any
portion of the natural gas produced by it for the purpose of using the gas or
allowing the use of the gas for the manufacture of carbon black was
challenged. The court held that the Corporation Commission had jurisdiction
to enter the order in question. The "wasteful utilization of such gas" is a
definition of waste and is a general term that vests the Commission with the
power to determine under a particular set of facts whether the same con-
stitutes a wasteful utilization of gas.", The court held it was within the con-
stitutional power of the legislature to vest the Corporation Commission with
this jurisdiction. Therefore, it is obvious that the state, in the proper exercise
of its police power and the preservation of so valuable a natural resource as
natural gas, may prohibit the wasteful utilization of the gas in the interest of
the public welfare.
7
It has been stated that "we may regard as definitely established the con-
stitutionality of selective use legislation, provided there is a reasonable basis
for the selection." 8 Some of the uses that have been selected as inferior uses
include the use of natural gas service for swimming pool heating,9 the use of
natural gas for operating unmantled gas lamps, 6 the consumption of gas for
" Id. at 310.
" Id. at 317.
Id.
s Id. at 322.
101 Okla. 164, 224 P. 156 (1924).
56 Id. at 157.
" Id. at 159.
5 Merrill, Stabilization of the Oil Industry and Due Process of Law, 3 So. CAL. L. Rav.
396 (1930).
19 National Swimming Pool Institute v. Kahn, 80 Misc. 2d 655, 364 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1975),
aff'd, 48 App. Div. 2d 736, 367 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1976).




boiler ise,6' and the practice permitting the flow of gas to escape into the
air. 6
Although there is a clear line of authority holding that a state, in the
exercise of its police power, can prohibit the use of resources for certain acti-
vities or operations, it is not as clear in regard to the establishment of
"preferred uses." Preferred use generally refers to requiring the use of a
natural resource for a particular purpose rather than prohibiting its use for a
particular purpose. It has been stated that "protection of respective interests
of production from a common pool, preservation of irreplaceable natural
resources against waste and devotion of such resources to socially preferred
uses, at least within reasonable limits, all have been recognized as legitimate
ends."' 63 Although someone must determine whether gas should be used to
heat homes; or to produce carbon black, the determination of which end uses
of gas are "superior" and which are "inferior" is a very difficult task.
In Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, 4 the Texas
court recognized the validity of preferred use legislation. The Texas Railroad
Commission had set priority uses for natural gas. The court held that if addi-
tional gas is not available and the public interest requires it, the Commission
may set priorities and may do this in accordance to the end use to be made of
the gas. 6" Moreover, in Interstate Natural Gas v. Federal Power
Commission,66 the result reached by the Court indicates a recognition of the
state's power to enact local conservation laws including the authority to pass
preferred use legislation. The regulation of natural gas use priorities within a
state are expressly made matters subject to state regulation by the provisions
of the Nafural Gas Act.6
7
Preferred use regulation is a relatively new doctrine in the field of
energy conservation. Despite some constitutional objections, the doctrine is
receiving recognition as a valid regulation under the police power, as the
foregoing discussion illustrates. A properly drafted piece of legislation setting
out a preferred use of an energy resource would not be unconstitutional on
its face.
Constitutional Objections to 52 Oklahoma Statutes § 10
In 1910 the Oklahoma legislature adopted a statute that gave authority
to every gas pipeline corporation or individual owner to construct pipelines
Houjston Lighting & Power Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 529 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1975).
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1930).
" Merrill, Stabilization of the Oil Industry and Due Process of Law, 3 So. CAL. L. REV.
396 (1930).
6" 529 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1975).
65 Id.
6 Interstate Nat. Gas Co. v. FPC, 311 U.S. 682 (1947).
-, 15 U.S.C.S. § 717(c). See also Note, Constitutional Law: Interstate Commerce:
Authority of FPC to Control the Use of Natural Gas, 14 OKLA. L. REV. 199 (1961). Note that
the Natural Gas Act is only controlling in areas of interstate transportation. The Act specifically
exempts the local distribution of natural gas.
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over or under highways, bridges, streets, and so forth." The statute further
provided that whenever any gas pipeline crossed the land of anyone outside
of a municipality, the corporation, upon request, was required to connect the
premises with the pipeline and furnish gas to the consumer at the same rate
as charged in the nearest city or town. 9 This statute was challenged in Bur-
mah Oil & Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission.70 Burmah sought a writ of
prohibition against the Corporation Commission to prevent it from pro-
ceeding with the claim of a landowner requesting an order requiring Burmah
to furnish natural gas service to his premises under the statute on the ground
that the statute was unconstitutional. The court refused to consider the con-
stitutionality of the statute because it found the Corporation Commission
was without jurisdiction to enforce the act. The court specifically held that
the Corporation Commission was without statutory or constitutional author-
ity to hear and determine disputes between private citizens or entities in
which the public interest was not involved.71
Section 10 of Title 52 was again challenged in Backus v. Panhandle
Eastern72 in which an Oklahoma farmer brought suit to compel Panhandle
Eastern to furnish him gas for the operation of irrigation pumps and to
recover damages for failure to deliver the gas. The federal district court
entered a temporary mandatory injunction requiring Panhandle to furnish
the gas. The court then held that the Oklahoma statute required Panhandle
to furnish gas to the plaintiff. Panhandle appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit on the grounds that the statute violated the commerce
clause and the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. The
Tenth Circuit held that the transmission of gas from one state to another is
interstate commerce and the fact that the gas the plaintiff received had not
crossed a state line before reaching plaintiff's pump did not exclude it from
the commerce clause.
73
The quantity of natural gas used to operate one irrigation pump does
not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, but cumulative
withdrawals for landowners under the Oklahoma statute might interfere with
interstate commerce. 7 The court determined, however, that a specific finding
of interference with interstate commerce was unnecessary. The court then
proceeded to determine that the Natural Gas Act gives the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) the power to regulate the transportation of gas in inter-
state commerce, the sale of gas in interstate commerce, and the natural gas
companies engaged in the transportation or sale of gas in interstate com-
merce. 75 The FPC had the power to regulate in this instance because Pan-
" 52 OKLA. STAT. § 10 (1971).
69 Id.
70 541 P.2d 834 (Okla. 1975).
71 Id. at 836.
72 558 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1977).
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handle was a company engaged in the transportation or sale of gas in inter-
state commerce. This state legislation frustrated the full effectiveness of a
federal law and was therefore rendered invalid by the supremacy clause.,
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of sec-
tion 10 in Transok Pipeline Co. v. Richardson." There was no supremacy
clause argument involved because all transactions in the fact situation were
intrastate in nature. The plaintiff in this case was relying on the statute in
requesting that gas be connected to his premises for residential purposes and
for the operation of a hog farm. The court found constitutional limits on the
practice of compelling a public or a nonpublic utility to service a market not
professed to be undertaken. 8 The gas company was required to connect, at
its own expense, gas to landowners over whose property the pipeline com-
pany had been granted a right of way. The rate was the same as that charged
by a utility company in the nearest city, which was less than the cost of the
gas to be furnished." This violated the state constitution's prohibition
against the taking of private property for private use.' 0
The New "Preferred Use" Statute: Have the Constitutional
Defects Been Remedied?
Although the Oklahoma court has held that a statute setting out a
preferred use of natural gas for irrigation purposes and a statute requiring a
pipeline company to furnish gas to the landowner both violate the state con-
stitution, the Oklahoma legislature remains undaunted. Recognizing the need
for such regulation of a natural resource, the legislature in 1977 passed
another statute dealing with both of these areas.'
The 1977 statute states that the use of natural gas, on the premises from
which it is produced or in pipelines located on the premises, to pump water
for irrigation "is a preferred use, prior in order to all other uses to which
such gas may be devoted." 82 The owner or operator of a gas well is required
to furnish, upon request, sufficient gas from production to operate irrigation
76 Id. at 1376. Note that only the second part of section 10 was declared unconstitu-
tional. The remainder of the statute, the authority to construct over highways, etc., was not at
issue and remains unaffected. Woodruff, Discussion Notes, 57 O.&.G.R. 574 (1977).
17 593 P.2d 1079 (Okla. 1978).
Ia. at 1080. See also note 31 supra.
" Transok Pipeline Co v. Richardson, 593 P.2d 1079 (Okla. 1978).
Id. Although the dissenting opinion in Transok stated that the Oklahoma court had
previously recognized the validity of section 10 in three decisions, citing Adkins v. Mustang Fuel
Corp., 527 11.2d 842 (Okla. 1974); Anchor Stone & Materials Co. v. Carlin, 436 P.2d 650 (Okla.
1968), and In re Vance, 115 Okla. 8, 241 P. 164 (1925), it is to be noted that only the Vance case
addressed the portion of the statute requiring the furnishing of gas to the landowner. The
Adkins case and the Anchor case both addressed the portion of the statute granting the right to
construct pipelines over or under highways, bridges, etc. Transok Pipeline Co. v. Richardson,
593 P.2d 1079 (Okla. 1978) (dissenting opinion).
" 52 OKLA. STAT. § 524-29 (Supp. 1977).
32 Id. § 524.
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pumps. This requirement is subject to prior contractual rights. The person
receiving the gas is to pay a price not to exceed that at which the gas is sold at
the wellhead and is to bear all costs. The owner or operator is also permitted
to receive a surcharge for costs incurred in connection with the furnishing of
the gas.
8 3
In addition, every operator of a natural gas gathering pipeline is
required by this new statute to make gas available for the operation of irriga-
tion pumps. The price charged for such gas is not to exceed 25 percent above
the prevailing wellhead costs. Although the owners of the pipeline are
required to make the connection, the agricultural occupant bears all the
costs. This section also allows the pipeline owner to be compensated for all
reasonable expenses.84
The Corporation Commission is given jurisdiction over the sales of
natural gas pursuant to the act and may adopt rules and regulations
necessary to insure compliance with the provisions of the act. Nothing in the
act is to be construed as creating the obligations of a public utility." If the
act is not complied with, the owner or operator of the pipeline may be liable
for all damages suffered by the agricultural occupant, including decreased
yield from the land because of the inability to irrigate.86
Whether the Oklahoma court will recognize the validity of this new
statute remains to be seen as it is yet unchallenged. Many of the constitu-
tional defects of the previous statutes have been remedied in the 1977 statute.
In the Transok case the major objection to the requirement that the pipeline
company furnish gas to the landowner was that the pipeline company was
not being fully compensated for the cost of furnishing the gas and had to
bear the full cost of connection." This objection is remedied in the 1977
statute as the agricultural occupant pays a reasonable price for the gas and is
required to bear all the expenses in connection with the furnishing of the
gas.
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In the Phillips case, the Oklahoma court objected to the statute requir-
ing the owner or operator of a gas well to furnish gas for irrigation purposes,
stating that such legislation was not within the police power of the state and
constituted a taking of private property without due process.89 The Phillips
decision was not well reasoned as it has been recognized that such regulation
is within the police power." The statute at issue in that case made no provi-
sion for price other than that it be "reasonable," and it allowed the Corpora-
tion Commission to set the price in the event of failure of negotiations be-
" Id. § 525.
" Id. § 526.
" Id. § 528.
" Id. § 529.
, See notes 77-80 and accompanying text supra.
" See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
" See notes 30-36 and accompanying text supra.
" See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
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